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ABSTRACT 
 
 
How much foreign aid given to PNG has stayed within the sectors to which it has 
been allocated and how much has it allowed the PNG Government to free up its own 
resources for other spending priorities? This paper measures the extent to which donor 
finance has contributed to higher rates of spending in three key development sectors 
of the PNG economy—health, education and infrastructure between 1974 and 2008. 
Results show that high rates of fungibility have occurred within PNG during this time. 
The PNG Government has placed the least priority on additional rates of health 
spending and most priority on additional infrastructure spending, although all sectors 
have increased by only a fraction of the amount of aid given. The results also compare 
the impact of budget support vis-à-vis project and program aid to induce higher rates 
of spending in each of these sectors. A number of policy implications follow. 
1. Introduction  
Papua New Guinea’s (PNG’s) continued slow rates of progress towards achieving key social welfare 
targets such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) reflects poor rates of access by large 
portions of the population to essential public services such as health, education and national 
infrastructure networks. Helping the PNG Government to improve access to these basic services is 
thus a central challenge for PNG’s major bilateral and multilateral donor partners, particular as they 
increasingly focus their efforts towards MDG targets.  
Batten (2009) considered how donor finance has influenced the PNG Government’s management 
of its fiscal aggregates such as levels of borrowing, domestic revenue collection and its impact on 
aggregate expenditure levels. This analysis showed that at the aggregate level it was the PNG 
Government’s response to the aid inflow, rather than donor priorities, that determined its overall 
impact on financing additional spending on pro-development activities. In particular it highlighted 
that large portions of foreign aid have had a weak overall impact on improving the amount of 
resources made available to pay for key social service delivery items within the PNG budget. This 
analysis was, however, limited in its ability to account for the impact of donor finance on spending 
in specific sectors by not accounting for the proportion of aid which has actually been delivered to 
those sectors.  
This paper seeks to build on the analysis of Batten (2009) by addressing two additional questions. 
Firstly, what impact has foreign aid had on total funding levels for three core service delivery 
priorities—health, education and infrastructure—in relation to the funding of general government 
consumption expenditure? Secondly, to what extent has the shift from general budgetary support to 
earmarked aid modalities such as project and program aid improved the amount of funding being 
provided to these three key service delivery sectors?  
Calculations of fungibility parameters in PNG are complicated by the fact that between 1975 and 
2008 it has received approximately 57 per cent of its foreign assistance in the form of direct 
budgetary support. As such, this paper extends the literature by calculating three different sets of 
parameters to measure to impact of foreign aid on sectoral expenditure levels. The first, measure the 
extent to which project and program aid has augmented or replaced PNG Government funding to 
that sector; the second, measure the proportion of budget support which was allocated to these 
sectors vis-à-vis general government consumption; and the third, combines the first two sets of 
parameters to measure the aggregate impact of a dollar increase in foreign aid allocated at its mean 
historical values.   
A number of authors have outlined their opposition using inter sectoral fungibility as a means of 
assessing the effectiveness of foreign aid (White 1998; Holmqvist 2000; McGillivray and Morrissey 
2000; McGillivray and Morrissey 2001a; McGillivray and Morrissey 2001b). These authors highlight 
that from a theoretical standpoint there is little a priori reason to believe that fungible aid will be any 
less effective than non fungible aid. Indeed, all that is required in order for fungibility to exist is a 
simple difference in the expenditure priorities between donor and recipient. This issue was analysed 
by Peterson (2007) who showed that despite an average of 65 per cent of sectoral aid being spent 
outside of its intended sector, there was no evidence that non fungible aid works better at 
encouraging growth than fungible aid (Peterson 2007:1081).  
This is an important point and it should be noted at the outset that this paper does not seek to judge 
the effectiveness of aid flows in PNG on the basis of whether they have been fungible, nor would 
the existence of fungibility constitute a justification for a reduction of aid flows. Rather, this paper 
uses the categorical fungibility framework to analyse both the impact of aid on sectoral expenditure 
levels and on the ability of earmarked aid vis-à-vis budgetary support to induce higher expenditure in 
priority development sectors of the PNG economy. Understanding how these two competing forms 
of aid delivery influence sectoral spending outcomes can offer some important insights into the 
design of future aid modalities seeking to provide additional finance for the attainment of MDG 
priorities.  
2. Literature Review  
The categorical fungibility literature is concerned specifically with how aid funds have influenced the 
total availability of resources within sectors of the recipient economy. In particular it seeks to 
determine to what extent the recipient government has altered its own sectoral expenditure in 
response to foreign resource inflows. Two approaches have been taken to measuring this sectoral 
fungibility. 
2.1 Utility Maximisation Studies  
The first approach to measuring the sectoral fungibility of aid derives a set of simultaneous linear 
expenditure equations from a recipient government that, it is assumed, maximises its utility function 
by distributing resources across each sector of the economy. Using this approach, Khilji and 
Zampelli (1991) find that in the case of Pakistan aid has indeed been highly fungible. However, 
instead of financing unproductive expenditure the majority of freed up resources are transferred to 
lower the tax burden on domestic constituents.1 Studying the effects of foreign aid on 
intergovernmental financing in India, Swaroop et al. (2000) find on the other hand that foreign aid 
simply acted as a substitute for spending that the government would have undertaken anyway–with 
freed up funds almost entirely reallocated to non-development activities such as defence and public 
administration. Feyzioglu et al. (1998) consider a panel of 38 aid recipients for the period 1970–90. 
These authors also find that for three of the five sectors examined foreign aid has been highly 
fungible. The authors then conclude that because most aid appears to be fungible assessing the 
impact of aid on individual sectors offers little in the way of capturing the full effect of foreign 
assistance. Instead they argue, foreign aid should be assessed against its contribution to the entire 
public sector expenditure behaviour of the recipient government.  
One criticism of the method adopted in papers such as Feyzioglu et al. (1998) is that because 
individual recipient bureaucracies respond in vastly different ways to aid inflow, a panel data 
approach is likely to aggregate important heterogenous impacts of aid, resulting in a loss of 
important information. Another criticism of papers such as those by Feyzioglu et al. (1998) and 
Swaroop et al. (2000) relates to the utility specification which they adopt for government 
preferences. Their approach distinguishes between two types of expenditure—those to which aid is 
allocated and others which receive no aid. Authors such as McGillivray and Morrissey (2000a:421) 
have argued that this assumption is acceptable only if there is reason to believe that these two types 
of expenditure can be separated within the government’s utility function such that aid funds can 
only affect government consumption decisions through the fungible portion whilst non fungible aid 
has no impact. Indeed, as Feyzioglu et al. (1998:34) highlight, this requires that ‘aid affects the 
government’s choice [over all public goods] only through the fungible portion; public goods 
purchased from the non fungible part do not affect this choice’. Given the inter related nature of all 
                                                          
1 Khilji and Zampelli (1994) also find that aid flows had been highly fungible with a large portion of the assistance being used to finance higher levels 
of private sector consumption and allowing the government to lower aggregate tax collection efforts. 
these expenditures, however, there is no reason for this to be the case. In fact, one of the central 
features of categorical fungibility highlights that if aid funding of one sector increases, then the 
fungible portion of that aid allows government to increase all other expenditures.  
2.2 Community Indifference Curve Studies  
The second method of calculating categorical fungibility also focuses on estimating a system of 
interdependent fiscal equations following an inflow of aid. In this case, government choices are 
made via indifference curves which express preferences for combinations of expenditure, subject to 
budget constraints which include both domestic revenues plus foreign aid (Pack and Pack 1993:259). 
While this approach is more ad hoc than the previous one, it does have the advantage of allowing 
the impact of aid receipts to affect government expenditure allocations across all areas of the budget, 
both aid-receiving and non aid-receiving. This approach is also useful for this paper because it helps 
distinguish between types of aid which are allocated to specific sectors (project and program aid) and 
those which simply augment general government revenue (budgetary support).  
Pack and Pack (1990) provide one of the earliest examples of this literature. The authors estimate 
the impact of aid inflows on a number of development and non development (current) expenditures 
for Indonesia between 1966 and 1986. They find that aid has tended to increase development 
expenditures, with funds remaining within those sectors for which they were intended. Additionally, 
they find that aid has tended to stimulate rather than reduce domestic revenue collection, alleviating 
concerns about the ability of aid to undermine the government’s incentive to tax domestic 
constituents. Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1990) study a panel of 46 countries between 1975 and 1980 
to determine what impact total aid flows have had on the size and composition of government 
expenditure by focusing on expenditure categories which distinguish between defence and non 
defence spending. They find that, in general, aid has had a stimulatory effect on public spending but 
that little to none of this has spilt over into the defence budget.  
Pack and Pack (1993) follow a similar method to their earlier paper in analysing the affect of aid on 
the Dominican Republic between 1968 and 1986. In contrast to the findings of their earlier paper, 
the authors find that the receipt of aid by recipients had been followed by major shifts in allocation 
from development expenditures to deficit reduction, debt service and, to a lesser extent, own-source 
revenue reduction.2 This shift in allocation, they conclude, has dramatically thwarted donors’ 
attempts to increase funding levels to key development sectors of the economy which the authors 
say may also be why cross-country analyses have found that aid contributes little to GDP growth 
(Pack and Pack 1993:264). Likewise, Van de Sjipe (2004:30) finds that after controlling for both on 
and off-budget aid flows for a panel of 105 countries between 1990 and 2003, education aid has had 
no discernible effect on education spending, while the effect of health aid on public health spending 
has been much smaller than the additional aid resources.  
Tiwara (2007) then replicates the model developed in Pack and Pack (1990) to study the effects of 
aid fungibility in Nepal between 1976 and 2001. The author finds that aid intended for a particular 
sector has, by and large, been spent within that sector and, in some cases, has induced the 
government to augment its own spending to that sector.  
2.3 Research Gap 
A limitation of community indifference curve studies has been their treatment of what are termed 
‘residual’ aid flows. The approach taken in all of these studies has been to select a number of sectors, 
i, for which fungibility is a concern (typically pro poor expenditure sectors such as health and 
education). All the residual, non ith sector expenditures are then placed into an ‘other’ or ‘general’ 
expenditure category. Likewise, aid flows are then classified on a similar sectoral basis such that all 
non ith sector aid flows are also included in a ‘general’ aid category. However, the assumption here is 
that project and program aid intended for other sectors not included in i, and other forms of aid 
delivery, such as non earmarked budget support, are treated equally by the government in its 
decisions over inter sectoral transfers. The weakness with this assumption is that project and 
program aid not included in any of the i-sectors has still been allocated to a specific activity whereas 
aid delivered through budgetary support has simply augmented domestic revenue collection.  
This means that budgetary support will be allocated entirely on the basis of government preferences 
whilst the portion of the residual project aid which is transferred will depend upon the degree to 
which the recipient government perceives it to be fungible. Given this, the inclusion of budgetary 
support in the residual project and program aid variable is likely to lead to an over estimate of the 
                                                          
2 Notably, the authors do find some evidence of the flypaper effect in the agriculture, public works and social services sectors. However, this effect did 
not appear to translate into more than proportional increases in government expenditures at the aggregate level (Pack and Pack 1993:264). 
amount of fungibility taking place from these residual aid allocations. This issue is particularly 
important in the case of PNG which has received approximately 57 per cent of its total foreign 
assistance in the form of budgetary support in the post independence era.  
In its analysis of PNG, this paper extends the literature by considering a model which allows for 
divergent impacts between each of these different types of aid delivery. In addition to reducing the 
potential for an upward bias of fungibility estimates, this model also facilitates a comparison of the 
impact of budgetary support and project/program aid on key development sectors of government 
spending.  
3. The Model 
The basic model to be estimated builds on Peterson (2007) and Pack and Pack’s (1990; 1993) model, 
to which is added the disaggregation of foreign grants into project aid and budgetary support. This 
creates a number of differences in the fungibility calculations which are discussed in the text. This 
paper also focuses on three categorical expenditure items—health, education and infrastructure. The 
decision to consider these three sectors was made on the basis of data availability and on the basis of 
the prominent role that each sector plays in PNG’s ability to achieve a large number of its MDG 
targets.3 All remaining project and program aid flows and expenditure are included in a general 
expenditure/aid category. The basic model to be estimated consists of a system of interdependent 
fiscal relationships of the form:  
                                                       , , ,
( , , , )i t t i t i t tED f gdp AD AO BS=                                             (1)
 ,
( , , , )t t t G t tEG f gdp AG AO BS=                                               (2)                                             
  
( , , )t t t tREV f gdp A BS=                                                           (3)                                                      
 
Where , is government expenditure on development sector i at time t. , is project aid 
allocations made to development sector i at time t. , is the remaining project aid allocations 
made to all development sectors other than sector i at time t. 	 is general government expenditure 
made to all other non development sectors at time t. 
, is aid allocations not made to the general 
                                                          
3 For example, four of the eight MDGs are primarily concerned with health and education. These include MDG2: Achieve universal primary 
education; MDG4: Reduce child mortality; MDG5: Improve maternal health; and MDG6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. 
category at time t.  is total project aid allocations to all sectors which is equal to ∑ , +
	 .   is non sector or activity specific budget support grants at time t and  is 
domestically generated revenue. Because of the static nature of the estimation process and the need 
for consistency with the literature, the fiscal system also includes a measure of GDP per capita, 
 , to control for the impact of the economic environment on spending and revenue levels. All 
variables are measured in per capita natural logarithms in constant 1999 prices.  
The Bougainville crisis was a traumatic episode for the political, economic and fiscal management of 
PNG. To control for this event and to determine whether it has had any structural effect on the 
expenditure and revenue management of the PNG economy, a dummy variable (dum) is also 
included in the estimations. This variable takes the value of zero for 1974–88 and one for 1989–
2008.  This leads to the estimation of the following system of equations: 
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In each period the government must satisfy an inter temporal budget constraint equal to:  
t t T T T t t
t t t t t
REV AE AH AI AG BS DEF
EE EH EI EG DS
+ + + + + +
= + + + +                                         (9) 
Which upon aggregation of the project aid and expenditure variables simplifies to:   
, ,
1 1
t i t t t i t t
i i
REV A BS DEF E DS
= =
+ + + = +∑ ∑
                                        (10) 
Where  is debt servicing costs and  is the government’s budget deficit or surplus. As has 
become standard in the literature, debt servicing is assumed to be exogenous and in this case 
included in the general government expenditure category, both to preserve degrees of freedom and 
to keep the model tractable.  
Equation (10) implies that the identities shown in Equations (4–8) are jointly determined and hence 
not independent of one another. This situation violates the OLS assumption of zero error term 
correlation and will lead to any OLS coefficient estimates being both biased and inconsistent. To 
deal with this issue, a systems estimation procedure known as SUR is utilised. SUR is a version of 
multivariate linear regression developed by Zellner (1962) which solves the minimal error variance 
for the estimated parameters through the simultaneous estimation of the system of equations.4 This 
procedure corrects for the correlation across the error terms in each equation, improving the 
efficiency of the coefficient estimates (Wooldridge 2002:144). 5 For the purposes of estimation, the 
budget deficit or net borrowing is taken as the excluded variable from the system of jointly 
determined equations to prevent the estimation of an identity in Equations (4–8). 
For each of the development expenditure Equations (4–6), a positive elasticity coefficient on the 
respective aid allocation variable (, > 0   = , , ) would indicate that an increase in aid 
funding results in increased categorical expenditures for each respective sector. On the other hand, a 
positive elasticity estimate on the other aid allocation variable (, > 0   = , , ) would indicate 
a transfer of resources from other aid funded activities to that expenditure category. Likewise, a 
positive elasticity estimate on the budgetary support coefficient (, > 0   = , , ) would 
                                                          
4 Seemingly unrelated regression estimates are obtained by first estimating a set of non linear equations with cross-equation constraints imposed, but 
with a diagonal covariance matrix of the disturbances across equations. These parameter estimates are used to form a consistent estimate of the 
covariance matrix of the disturbances, which is then used as a weighting matrix when the model is re estimated to obtain new values of the 
parameters. These estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal and, under some conditions, asymptotically more efficient than the single 
equation estimates. 
5 Notably, estimating a system of equations simultaneously only improves the efficiency of the coefficient estimates if there is some connection 
between each of the equations of interest (Kennedy 2003:314). 
indicate that an increase in un earmarked aid funding leads to an increase in expenditure for that 
development expenditure category.6   
The aggregate impact of fungibility on expenditure allocations will then depend on all three of these 
estimated coefficients. This total affect of aid will determine the degree to which fungibility has 
distorted, if at all, final expenditure allocations for each sector. This approach builds on Pack and 
Pack (1990:192) and simulates the effect of a percentage increase in total foreign aid per capita 
(project aid and budgetary support) on each of the expenditure categories.   
To do this, the elasticity coefficients together with the historical averages of each of the categories 
for aid are used to calculate the change in each of the expenditure categories, as well as own-
revenues, which results from a simultaneous change in each of the categories of foreign aid. The 
initial categorical levels of foreign aid are equal to  
 ! "#  where " is total foreign aid and  !  is the 
average level of foreign aid given to category i across the period. For Equation (6.4) the elasticity 
effect with respect to education aid is equal to: 
2
ln
ˆ
ln EE
EE
EA
β∂ =
∂  
where given that EE and EA are measured in natural logarithms, 2
ˆ
EEβ  represents an elasticity 
coefficient. This elasticity of education expenditures with respect to education project and program 
aid can thus be written as:   
2
2
ˆ t t
EE
t t
t t
EE
t t
EE AE
AE EE
EE EE
AE AE
β
β
∆
= ⋅
∆
∆
⇒ = ⋅
∆
 
Multiplying this term by the proportion of an overall aid per capita increase which is allocated to the 
education sector based on historical averages gives:  
2
t t E
EE
t t
EE EE A
AE AE A
β∆ =
∆
 
                                                          
6 It should be noted that from a theoretical perspective it is also required that the sum of the budgetary support coefficients across all the expenditures 
not exceed 1.  
where A is total foreign aid and EA is the average amount of total aid given to the education sector. 
This can then be rewritten as: 
, 2
ˆˆ t
EA t EE
t
EEdEE dAE
AE
β=  
where 
,
ˆ
EA tdEE is the total change in education expenditure from a prorated change in project aid 
allocated to the education sector. Completing the same process for the other project aid and 
budgetary support variables then gives the total effect of an increase in aid on education 
expenditures. This can be written as: 
 
2 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ t t t
t EE EE EE
t EEt t
EE EE EEdEE dAE dAO dBS
AE AO BS
β β β= + +                     (11) 
 
where ˆ tdEE is the total change in education expenditures from an increase in foreign aid of all 
types—project aid given to education, other project aid and budgetary support—allocated at 
historical averages. Equally, the total effect of an increase in aid for the other expenditure and 
revenue items considered in Equations (6.4–6.9) can be written as:  
2 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ t t t
t EH EH EH
t EHt t
EH EH EHdEH dAH dAO dBS
AH AO BS
β β β= + +                            (12) 
2 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ t t t
t EI EI EI
t EIt t
EI EI EIdEI dAI dAO dBS
AI AO BS
β β β= + +                                      (13) 
2 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ t t t
t EI EI EI
t EGt t
EG EG EGdEG dAG dAG dBS
AG AO BS
β β β= + +                                  (14)
2 3
ˆ ˆˆ t t
t REV REV
t t
REV REVdREV dA dBS
A BS
β β= +                                                      (15)  
 
This model thus has a number of important features which are useful in the analysis of the fiscal 
effects of aid in the PNG context. Firstly, it distinguishes between ‘other project and program aid’ 
and ‘general budgetary support aid’, which has typically been included in the ‘other aid’ category in 
the literature. Secondly, it allows aid to all expenditure categories to influence the consumption 
choices of government in all, even non aid-receiving, sectors of the economy. Thirdly, it 
distinguishes between government expenditure and aid revenue according to their function rather 
than the recurrent and development classifications used in much of the literature. This distinction 
gives a more relevant assessment of the contribution of fiscal policy settings to key welfare targets 
such as the MDGs. Lastly, the SUR estimation procedure accounts for the interdependent nature of 
these fiscal relationships, which allows the estimation procedure to correct for any simultaneity bias 
which may have occurred within a non simultaneous equation framework.  
4. Data Collection  
GDP, expenditure and revenue data is obtained from official PNG budget documents as described 
in Appendix 1. This paper uses the same methodology as established in Batten (2009) for the 
allocation of government expenditure by sector, with the IMF GFS database being used for pre 
2002 expenditure data and government budget documents being used for post 2002. This paper 
does, however, require a more detailed matching up of aid allocations with sectoral expenditures. 
The IMF GFS and OECD DAC databases are not directly comparable and require an element of 
discretion on the author’s behalf as to which expenditure is allocated to which sector. A full 
description of this can be found in Appendix 1. 
As is typical within the literature, the OECD DAC database was used to obtain sectoral aid flows. 
Optimally, this aid data would record disbursements by sector; however, the database only has a 
sufficiently complete time series of categorical expenditures on a donor commitment basis—with aid 
disbursement data only available at an aggregate level. To overcome this, Petterson’s (2007) method 
is followed—sectoral commitment data is used to calculate the share of project and program aid 
going to each sector as well as the share being given as budgetary support each year. These 
proportions are then applied to the total disbursements data to give aid allocations by sector and by 
type (project and program aid vs. budgetary support). Whilst there is little a priori evidence to 
suggest that certain types of aid would be disbursed more than others following donor 
commitments, a fundamental assumption of this paper is that aid disbursements by sector are 
allocated in the same proportion to which donor commitments are made. A full description of the 
alignment of sectoral aid flows to sectoral expenditure can be found in Appendix 2.   
The general budgetary support variable measures commodity aid and general unallocated program 
assistance. This includes contributions for general development purposes without sector allocation, 
with or without restrictions on the specific use of the funds (and irrespective of any control by the 
donor of the use of counterpart funds). Funds supplied on the general condition that they be used 
for capital projects at the recipient’s choice, but not subject to agreement by the donor, are also 
included (OECD DAC 2007). Project aid, on the other hand, is defined by the direct participation of 
the donors in the design and implementation of a developmental project with a specific purpose. 
This data is measured in US$ and converted into Kina with period average exchange rates. All 
nominal data are deflated into 1999 constant prices with the consumer price index and measured in 
per capita natural logarithms. A summary of this data in is presented in Table 1.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables—Per Capita Values in 1999 Values (1974–2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
gdppc GDP per capita 35 2,323.44 334.20 1,634.80 3,417.37 
a_h Health sector 
project aid 
35 7.11 7.77 0.00 24.39 
a_e Education sector 
project aid 
35 11.32 13.14 0.00 42.16 
a_in Infrastructure 
sector project aid 
35 23.22 17.50 0.00 66.78 
a_g All other general 
project aid 
35 47.66 40.97 4.69 225.87 
a_pr Total project aid 35 89.83 48.90 9.04 251.83 
a_bs Non sector 
allocated and/or 
budgetary 
support aid 
35 125.54 119.94 0.00 458.22 
e_h Government 
expenditure on 
health 
35 52.75 14.43 25.00 73.79 
e_e Government 
expenditure on 
education 
35 106.66 33.30 29.93 145.56 
e_in Government 
expenditure on 
infrastructure 
35 58.85 30.08 12.92 130.26 
e_g All other general 
government 
expenditure  
35 450.79 58.69 325.58 553.42 
e Total government 
expenditure 
35 669.05 103.85 425.05 853.40 
rev Domestic 
revenue 
collection  
35 489.84 78.28 366.99 637.79 
Note: All variables in the table are measured in constant 1999 per capita Kina. Data 
transformed with natural logarithms for estimations.   
It should be noted that in some ways this data contradicts that used in Batten (2009). In that paper 
for example, project aid flows only began in 1989. The current data has sectoral allocations, albeit 
relatively small in comparison to budgetary support, beginning in 1974. This reflects the use in the 
previous paper of on-budget aid flows whereas the OECD DAC database records aid flows from 
the perspective of the donor. Prior to the 1990s, little attempt was made in PNG to incorporate 
project aid flows into the budgetary process.7 In part, this was because project aid comprised such a 
small proportion of total foreign assistance. It is also likely to be a reflection of the lower priority 
that aid donors placed during this period on strengthening local institutional and bureaucratic 
processes, with aid delivery channels often circumventing domestic budgetary processes. 
Nevertheless, it is this inconsistency in the available data which is exploited to facilitate the current 
analysis.  
5. Results  
5.1 SUR Estimation Results  
Table 2 presents the results of the simultaneous estimation of Equations (4–8) using the SUR 
estimation technique. Each of the equations is well identified with adjusted R2 values ranging from 
0.74 for the education equation to 0.54 for the revenue equation. The only exception is the general 
expenditure category, which records an R2 of 0.25, most likely reflecting the much greater degree of 
aggregation of both the project aid and expenditure data for this category. 
Although the above coefficient estimates do not take into account the full effects of foreign aid 
fungibility as described through Equations (11–15), a number of important inferences can be made. 
Firstly, it can be seen that the budgetary support variable has a significant and positive impact on 
each of the expenditure and revenue equations. The size of these elasticities ranges from 0.162 in the 
education equation to 0.026 in terms of revenue collection. In addition, the size of the budgetary 
support coefficients is much larger for the education, health and infrastructure equations than it is 
for the general category, indicating that a majority of this financial assistance has tended to be 
allocated towards these three core development priorities.  
The positive budgetary support coefficient and the negative total project aid coefficient in the 
revenue equation provide further evidence for the results obtained in Batten (2009). In this case, the 
estimations were only able to distinguish a close to zero net effect for both types of aid delivery on 
                                                          
7 It was not until 1996, for example, that the PNG Government decided to include project aid flows as part of its revenues (World Bank 1999:25). 
domestic revenue collection, despite overall grants having an unambiguous negative effect. These 
results suggest however that it has in fact been project aid that has been responsible for a large 
portion of the negative impact of grants on domestic revenue collection. 
Table 2: SUR Estimation Results for Categorical Expenditure  
SUR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lnEE lnEH lnEI lnEG lnRev 
lngdp 1.213*** -0.306 0.302 -0.032 0.174 
 (0.351) (0.260) (0.511) (0.178) (0.170) 
lnAE 0.057* - - - - 
 (0.029) - - - - 
lnAH - -0.051* - - - 
 - (0.030) - - - 
lnAI - - 0.015 - - 
 - - (0.051) - - 
lnAG - - - 0.001 - 
 - - - (0.024) - 
lnOAiψ -0.034 -0.044 0.093 0.043 - 
 (0.074) (0.055) (0.086) (0.032) - 
lnBS 0.162*** 0.112*** 0.102** 0.034** 0.026* 
 (0.033) (0.024) (0.048) (0.017) (0.014) 
lnA - - - - -0.095** 
 - - - - (0.042) 
Dum 0.137 0.023 -0.534*** -0.038 0.344*** 
 (0.123) (0.101) (0.175) (0.063) (0.057) 
Constant -5.448** 6.142*** 1.133 6.090*** 4.951*** 
 (2.578) (1.925) (3.793) (1.319) (1.242) 
Obs 33 33 33 33 33 
F-Stat 
(P-value) 
20.47 
(0.000) 
16.55 
(0.000) 
10.54 
 (0.000) 
2.51 
 (0.033) 
9.45 
 (0.000) 
Adj. R-Sq 0.743 0.697 0.616 0.248 0.537 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. ψ 
lnOAi  measures total project aid allocations less aid allocations from the dependent variable category (i).  
Note: For the purposes of estimation, the origin is re-based to +1 by adding one to each observation. A 
number of variables in a number of years have observations which are close or equal to zero. Taking the 
natural logarithm of these values would thus lead to them turning negative and also result in the low values of 
aid and expenditure allocations becoming more dispersed whilst the higher values become more compressed. 
In the estimation, this would give undue weight to the lower valued aid and expenditure observations which is 
likely to cause a bias in the results. Adding one to each of the observations also has the added advantage of 
allowing the inclusion of the zero valued aid and expenditure observations and allowing all values to remain 
strictly positive (Van de Sijpe 2007:36).  
 
The positive coefficients of the categorical aid variables for education and infrastructure indicate that 
in the first instance an increase in aid to these sectors leads to an increase, albeit small, in total 
expenditure levels for their respective categories. The negative coefficient on the health foreign aid 
variable indicates a diversion of aid from this category to other purposes.8 The degree to which this 
has taken place will be discussed shortly.  
                                                          
8 This could include, for example, the financing of a tax reduction or repayment of government debt. 
It also appears that there has been a limited amount of redirection of categorical aid amongst each of 
the development expenditures. For example, education and health have negative coefficients for 
their other aid variables whilst infrastructure has a positive coefficient, although none are significant. 
The positive coefficient estimate suggests that a redirection of categorical aid from other 
expenditure categories has occurred towards the infrastructure sector. In contrast, the negative 
coefficient estimates arise when there has been a diversion of categorical aid from each of the 
categorical expenditure items toward other expenditure items. This could include, for example, an 
increase in debt servicing or a reduction in tax collection.9  
Of particular interest are the highly significant negative and positive coefficient estimates for the 
dummy variable in the infrastructure and revenue equations respectively. The former result suggests 
that in the post Bougainville crisis era, there has been a significant structural reduction in the 
financing of infrastructure development after controlling for changes in the GDP level and both 
budgetary support and project aid receipts. This finding supports the conclusion that the crisis has 
had long lasting impacts on fiscal management and the government’s ability to finance critical 
national infrastructure development projects well beyond the immediate 1991 revenue collapse and 
the following foreign currency shortages experienced in 1994. 
The latter result also suggests, however, that in the post Bougainville crisis era, the government has 
sought to augment its domestic revenue collection. This may, for example, reflect an inherent 
preference by the government not to rely on aid receipts as a source of revenue in order to avoid a 
replication of the early 1999s, when the Australian Government’s decision to switch from budgetary 
support to project aid exacerbated an already stressed fiscal situation.10  
To determine the full impact which foreign grants have had on levels of sectoral expenditure, it is, 
however, necessary to aggregate the impact of both aid given to each of the categorical sectors as 
well as the influence of other categorical aid and budgetary support. Column 1 in Table 3 shows the 
prorated foreign aid allocations which measure the historical average of aid allocated to that sector. 
Column 2 shows the individual effects of each type of aid on each expenditure and revenue item 
                                                          
9 As argued by Pack and Pack (1993:262), ‘negative coefficients may arise in the other foreign aid coefficients when there is a diversion of categorical 
aid from development investment toward, for example, debt service’. 
10 Given the congruence of timing between the crisis and the major switch between aid types, this coefficient may also reflect a desire by the 
government to generate additional own-source revenues in order to maintain funding to expenditure areas which were not being supported by 
project aid receipts. 
calculated according to the method shown in Equations (11–15). Column 3 shows the total change 
in expenditure or revenue expected from a one dollar increase in total aid flows allocated according 
to its historical mean. 
Table 3: PNG ODA Allocations by Development Expenditure Category 
Sector (1) 
Prorated 
change in 
foreign aid 
(2) 
Change in expenditure/revenue 
i
i i
A EiEXP A
AiA
β∆ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∆  
(3) 
Total change 
in 
expenditure/ 
revenue 
 
Education 
iA
A
 iβ   Ei/Ai11 iEXP∆   
a) AE 0.056 0.057 8.741 0.0279  
b) AOE 0.369 -0.034 0.191 -0.0024 (2a+2b) 
0.0255 
c) BS 0.575 0.162 0.851 0.0793 (2a+2b+2c) 
0.1048 
Health      
a) AH 0.036 -0.051 6.628 -0.0122  
b) AOH 0.389 -0.044 0.631 -0.0108 (2a+2b) 
-0.023 
c) BS 0.575 0.112 0.425 0.0274 (2a+2b+2c) 
0.0044 
Infrastructure      
a) AI 0.110 0.015 2.471 0.0041  
b) AOI 0.315 0.093 0.866 0.0254 (2a+2b) 
0.0295 
c) BS 0.575 0.102 0.473 0.0277 (2a+2b+2c) 
0.0572 
General      
a) AG 0.221 0.001 9.283 0.0021  
b) AOG 0.204 0.043 10.119 0.0888 (2a+2b) 
0.0909 
c) BS 0.575 0.034 3.570 0.0910 (2a+2b+2c) 
0.0182 
Domestic 
Revenue 
     
a) A 0.425 -0.095 5.260 -0.212 (2a+2b) 
-0.154 
b) BS 0.575 0.026 3.879 0.0579  
* Indicates that the total calculated change in expenditure level is significantly different 
from the prorated change in expenditure levels at a 5 per cent significance level.  
 
5.2 Impact of Project Aid Allocated at Historical Averages (2a+2b) 
For every dollar of foreign aid given since independence, 42.5 cents has been in the form of sector 
allocated project aid. Of this 42.5 cents, 5.6 cents has been allocated to the education sector. The 
results show that the direct impact of this education aid has been to increase education expenditure 
by approximately 2.8 cents. The negative result on the other project aid variable, however, indicates 
that there has also been a diversion of categorical expenditures away from this sector. In addition to 
                                                          
11 Such that for the education equation the following calculations are made for rows 1-3 respectively: 1) e_e/a_e  2) ee/a_e_o  3) e_e/bs. 
debt and revenue responses, this diversion of funds may be suggestive of the existence of aid-
induced flypaper effects occurring in other sectors of the economy, whereby an increase in funding 
for other project aid sectors tends to draw government resources away from the education sector. In 
this case, however, this effect is relatively small such that the total impact of project aid on education 
funding is still equal to 2.5 cents for every 5.6 cents of education aid. Whilst a degree of fungibility 
has taken place, approximately half of the allocated funds appear to have remained within the sector 
and have not been diverted to other uses. As a result, aid funds have managed to substantially 
increase the availability of resources in the sector—albeit at a less than one to one ratio.  
In contrast to this result, project aid allocated to health and other project aid appear to have had a 
negative impact on overall expenditure levels within the sector. Here it is observed that the historical 
average of a 3.6 cent increase in health aid leads to a 1.2 cent decrease in total health expenditures. 
When combined with the additional diversionary effects of the other project aid variable, this then 
leads to a total 2.3 cent decline in health expenditure for the additional 42.5 cents of project aid 
allocated at a historical mean.  
Observations of negative fungibility are in general un intuitive as there is little theoretical reason to 
believe that an inflow of aid resources to a sector would induce the recipient government to subtract 
more than that amount of their own funding from the sector. However, one plausible explanation 
for this result is the use of aid to pressure the PNG Government to scale-back spending in pursuit 
of fiscal balance or to increase debt repayments (as found in Batten 2009). Compliance with these 
conditions requires a decision over which sectors of the budget will receive reduced funding, and in 
the event that these funding cuts are greater than the inflow of aid, there may be a net outflow of 
funds from the sector. Another explanation of this effect is the tendency of project aid to reduce 
domestic revenue collection, which in turn may lower the aggregate availability of domestic 
resources, which in turn results in reduced funding for the health sector. More broadly, this result 
also supports the notion that, despite an increasing amount of donor resources allocated to the 
health sector, total per capita expenditure levels have continued to fall throughout the past two 
decades.  
Of the three development sectors, infrastructure has been the largest recipient of categorical aid 
flows, receiving 11 out of every 42.5 cents given as project aid. Of this, only a small portion appears 
to have remained in the sector, with expenditure increasing by just 0.4 cents for each 11 cents of 
infrastructure aid. In this case, however, there is also a positive diversion of other project aid funds 
into the sector equal to approximately 2.5 cents for each additional 31.5 cents of other project aid. 
This leads to a total increase of infrastructure funding equal to just under 3 cents for each additional 
11 cents of infrastructure project aid.  
This result appears to be counter intuitive. Why would the PNG Government withdraw resources 
given directly to the sector and then allocate resources freed up from project aid in other sectors 
back into infrastructure? There are at least two possible explanations. The first is an issue of timing. 
These results represent historical averages and the years in which the PNG Government perceives 
infrastructure funding to be inadequate and the years in which donors tend to increase or decrease 
their funding to the sector need not necessarily overlap. As a result, the estimates may be observing 
the transfer of funds between time periods.  
The second explanation relates to the within-sector priorities of recipients and donors. In the case of 
PNG, for example, donors have, particularly in the past, focused a majority of their road building 
and maintenance attention on highly visible projects with large scale but generally diffused economic 
benefits, such as the Highlands Highway. The PNG Government may, however, place a higher 
priority on funding other roads which generate more political benefit, such as those connecting 
regions within their particular electorate. One response of the PNG Government to this 
circumstance could then be to reallocate freed up resources from the donor funded road project to 
its other expenditure priorities and then divert funds made available from other project aid back into 
the infrastructure sector to fund its own road building preferences. In any event, both of these 
arguments highlight the point that sectoral funding levels of the infrastructure sector have been 
predominately determined by the public sector fiscal behaviour of the PNG Government—despite 
the high levels of aid being channeled into the sector.  
In the general expenditure category, it is again observed that large scale inter sectoral fungibility has 
taken place, but that the effect of project aid on the sector has remained positive. For every 22 cents 
of project aid allocated to the general category, expenditure has increased by just over 9 cents. The 
majority of this increase has, however, occurred as a result of a positive diversion of funds from 
other sectors into the general category.  
Finally, project aid is shown to have had a large negative impact on domestic revenue collection. For 
each additional 42.5 cents of project aid, domestic revenue collection has, on average, declined by 
approximately 21 cents.   
5.3 Impact of Budgetary Support Allocated at Historical Averages (2c)  
Despite not being tied by donors to any specific activities, budgetary support is shown to have a 
positive impact on each of the development expenditure categories and on general expenditures. Of 
the 57 cents of each additional aid dollar allocated as budgetary support, there is a requisite 7.9 cent 
increase in education funding, 2.7 cent increase in health funding, 2.8 cent increase in infrastructure 
funding and a 9 cent increase in general government expenditure. To an extent, these results reject 
the concerns raised in Paper 4 by various authors about the tendency of budgetary support to fund 
general government consumption rather than productive investment activities. Every 13.4 cents out 
of 57 cents given as budgetary support has been allocated to the three development sectors, whilst 
just 9 cents is allocated towards general expenditure—despite this general category accounting for 
just over 67 per cent of total government expenditures. Translating these effects into a situation 
whereby an additional dollar of aid was given entirely as budgetary support also reveals that 
education expenditure would increase by roughly 14 cents, health and infrastructure would both 
increase by 5 cents and other general expenditures would increase by 16 cents.  
The period of budgetary support is also shown to have augmented domestic revenue collection, with 
the additional 57 cents of non allocated aid leading to an average 5.7 cent increase in domestic 
revenue collection. As shown in Equation (16), the total change in donor resources for budgetary 
support ( tBS∆ ) in any period t, must equal the sum of the total change in expenditure for the four 
expenditure categories (
4
,
1
i t
i
E
=
∆∑ ) plus the change in domestic revenue ( tT∆ ) and any change in the 
government’s debt liabilities (where t t tD DEF DS∆ = ∆ + ∆  ).   
4
,
1
t i t t t
i
BS E T D
=
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆∑                                               (16) 
Assuming a constant level of project aid, it can be said that the effect of the 57 cents of budgetary 
support will be to fund an additional 22.4 cents of expenditure and generate an additional 5.8 cents 
of domestic revenue, which, by implication, also means that it funded a 40.4 cent reduction in the 
government’s deficit/debt liabilities.  
5.4 Total Impact of Foreign Aid Allocated at Historical Averages (2a+2b+2c) 
For each spending category, an additional dollar of foreign aid leads to a positive impact on 
expenditure levels. Only in the case of the education sector, however, does the increase in 
categorical expenditure meet or exceed the increase in categorical aid flows. For every dollar of aid, 
about 5.6 cents has been allocated to the education sector, which when combined with the positive 
impact of budgetary support, has led to an increase in total education funding by just over 10 cents.  
In contrast, for every additional dollar of aid, about 3.6 cents has been allocated to the health sector. 
This additional 3.6 cents of directly targeted assistance has, however, managed to increase total 
funding for the sector by only approximately 0.44 cents. Likewise, despite the infrastructure sector 
receiving approximately 11 cents in each aid dollar since independence, the resulting increase in total 
funding to the sector has only increased by approximately half that amount, at 5.7 cents. For these 
last two categories then it is clear that there has been a substantial diversion of funds by the 
government away from the intended donor expenditure patterns. In the general expenditure 
category, for each additional dollar of grant aid, of which 22 cents per aid dollar has been allocated 
towards general expenditure, there is a relatively small 2 cent increase in expenditure levels for the 
sector.  
Finally, as discussed, the 57 per cent of aid allocated as budgetary support has tended to have a 
positive impact on domestic revenue collection, whilst the 43 per cent allocated as project aid has 
had a negative impact. The positive effect of budgetary support is, however, approximately one-
quarter the size of the negative impact of project aid, which leads to an overall negative impact of 
aid on revenue collection equal to 15 cents for each additional dollar of aid allocated. These results 
are consistent with those observed in Paper 5, which found that grant aid had undermined domestic 
revenue collection. These results are also consistent with Feeny (2007:29) who found that aid to the 
Melanesian region as a whole has had a limited impact on encouraging growth in rural areas, partly 
as a result of the negative effect of aid on domestic revenue collection efforts.12  
                                                          
12 This shifting impact of aid on revenue may also reflect the changing quality of governance observed in PNG during this period. Gupta et al. (2003), 
for example, find that whilst foreign aid has in general tended to have only a relatively small dampening effect on the revenue collection efforts of 
recipient governments, in countries plagued by high levels of corruption, the decline in revenues tends to completely offset any increase in grants. As 
such, the widely acknowledge decline in governance and bureaucratic quality experienced in PNG, especially during the 1990s may in part then help 
to explain why budgetary support has been more effective at stimulating an increase in domestic revenue collection.  
6. Discussion and Conclusion  
This paper has analysed a variety of issues related to the impact of aid on sectoral expenditure in 
post independence PNG. In particular, it has sought to assess the relative impact of budgetary 
support vis-à-vis project-based aid on increasing aggregate expenditure levels in three key 
development sectors of the PNG economy—health, education and infrastructure. It has also 
analysed the extent to which funds allocated to these sectors have been diverted to general 
government consumption activities. In total, aid has made a positive contribution to the overall 
funding levels of all expenditure categories in PNG since independence. This result does, however, 
mask a number of important differences between project aid and budgetary support across sectors.  
Firstly, there is significant evidence for project aid showing that large scale fungibility has taken place 
across a number of sectors of the PNG economy, with expenditure increases far below the allocated 
project aid amounts. According to historical averages, for a given increase in education funding, total 
resources to that sector increase by about half that amount whilst total infrastructure spending 
increases by approximately one-third of the amount allocated as project aid. Likewise, just under half 
of the project aid allocated to the general category has remained in the sector. In contrast, project aid 
by itself appears to have had a negative impact on overall expenditure levels within the health sector.  
Secondly, approximately half of the budgetary support has been used to finance higher levels of 
government expenditure. Of this increased expenditure, 60 per cent has been allocated to the health, 
education and infrastructure sectors whilst the remaining 40 per cent has been allocated to the 
general government expenditure category. This is a relatively positive result, especially given that this 
general category accounts for two-thirds of total government expenditures. The remaining budgetary 
support funds have been used primarily to achieve a reduction in the government’s deficit and debt 
liabilities.  
Thirdly, in terms of revenue collection, the majority of the negative impact of foreign grants appears 
to have occurred during the project aid rather than budgetary support period. An explanation for 
this result is that even though during the budget support era the PNG Government was receiving 
far greater levels of foreign assistance, there was a clear mandate provided by Australia for a 
reduction in aid flows—on average budget support declined by 8 per cent per annum in real per 
capita terms between 1975 and 1989. In contrast, the project aid period, whilst contributing less to 
overall government resources, has experienced relatively stable real per capita funding levels—
imposing less pressure on the PNG Government to find domestic resources to replace aid funds.  
The results offer a number of important policy implications as donors seek to help PNG reach its 
MDG targets. Firstly, it must be said that the existence of fungibility is not a sufficient condition to 
establish the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of foreign aid per se. Rather, it offers an important 
insight into how foreign aid interacts with public sector behaviour to influence aggregate fiscal 
outcomes. In particular, these results highlight that it is the way in which the recipient government 
responds to an aid inflow that matters most in determining the effectiveness of that aid in improving 
service delivery to specific sectors. The lesson for donors here is that efforts to alter how they give 
aid in order to control its usage will almost inevitably be circumvented by a government who wishes 
to fund other priorities. The focus of development discourse therefore must remain on establishing 
a productive dialogue between donor and recipient to determine mutually agreeable expenditure 
priorities and not on increasingly tying aid to specific activities which the donor finds appealing.  
This evidence also disputes the notion that PNG health, education and infrastructure outcomes can 
be improved simply by aid agencies choosing to re-align their aid allocations towards these sectors. 
This highlights the point that achieving the MDGs rests not with the provision of donor-funded 
resources to a particular sector but rather with the PNG Government’s desire and, just as 
importantly, ability, to effectively resource and implement programs in each one of these sectors. 
Hence, the effectiveness of aid should not be judged on how stringent the expenditure controls are 
or how tightly aligned aid-funded expenditures are with donor priorities but rather how useful that 
assistance has been in promoting improvements in the recipient government’s own expenditure 
management systems, processes and outcomes. 
Finally, as Australia seeks to increase the performance orientation of its aid program, it may consider 
opening up the potential for using alternative un earmarked aid modalities—such as budgetary 
support. The results have shown that tying aid funds to specific expenditure priorities has given 
donors a false sense that their aid allocations can influence aggregate spending outcomes. Loosening 
the grip which donors place on their funding in return for specific expenditure behaviour may thus 
prove to be a productive way forward for the Australian aid program in PNG. Indeed, this type of 
aid delivery is now being carried out in numerous other regions including Latin America, Africa and 
Eastern Europe. How this may be implemented in a PNG context is a fruitful area for further 
research and discussion.    
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Appendix 1: Data Collection and Sources  
In order to obtain a complete time series of PNG’s fiscal and GDP data, a number of data sources 
were used. In the first instance, data was sourced from a number of documents containing budget 
actuals data in order to obtain a complete time series for the period from a consistent source. These 
budget actuals data were sourced from the following sources for the corresponding years.  
Table 4: Sources for Government Revenue and Grant Data 
Document  Years of Budget 
Actuals Covered 
World Bank (1977) 1970–72 
Sims and Daniel (1986) 1972–82 
Stein (1991) 1983–86 
1993 Budget    1987–91 
1995 Budget    1992–94 
1997 Budget    1995 
1998 Budget    1996–97 
2000 Budget    1998 
2004 Budget 1999–2001 
2007 Budget 2002 
2008 Budget 2003-2008 
 
In terms of expenditure, between 1974 and 2002 sectoral expenditure allocations were made in 
accordance with the IMF Government Financial Statistics Database. In this case, expenditure was 
classified into five categories. These included health, education, law and order, infrastructure, and 
other. The classifications used from the IMF database to allocate these expenditures are shown 
below in Table 5.  
Table 5: Categorisation of IMF GFS Data into Expenditure Categories 
Category IMF GFS Code (Table 7) 
1. Health 11. Health  
2. Education 13. Education   
3. Law and Order 4. Public order and safety  
4. Infrastructure  6. Agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
hunting 
7. Fuel and energy 
 8. Mining, manufacturing and 
construction 
9. Transport 
5. General 8. Recreation, culture, and religion 6. Housing and community 
amenities 
 2a. Public Debt Transactions  10. Social Welfare and 
Protection 
 3. Defence 11. Other Non Allocated 
Expenditures 
 5e. Other Economic Affairs and Services 2b. General public services 
(less Public debt transactions) 
 
The most recent 2008 version of the IMF database only covers up to 2002. As a result, another data 
collection effort was undertaken decomposing recent government expenditures into each of the five 
classifications listed above. This involved allocating expenditures from both the recurrent and 
development components of the national PNG budget.  
Recurrent expenditures were allocated according to Volume II, Part 1, Table 2 of the budget which 
calculates recurrent expenditures on a functional basis. These expenditures were first allocated 
according to the IMF categories and then allocated into each of the five expenditure categories as 
shown in Table 6.  
Table 6: Allocation of Recurrent Budget Expenditures to IMF Classifications  
IMF Classification tion System  Budget Volume II, Part 1, Table 2 
Classification Code 
General public services 11, 13, 14, 15, 19, 41, 51, 52, 53  
Public debt transactions  51, 52, 53  
General public services (less Public debt 
transactions) 
11, 13, 14, 15, 19, 41 
Defence 18 
Public order and safety 17 
Economic affairs 12, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting  31 
Fuel and energy 33 
Mining, manufacturing and construction  35 
Transport and communications 36 
Other economic affairs  12, 32, 34, 39 
Housing and community amenities 24, 25  
Health 22 
Recreation, culture and religion  27, 28 
Education 16, 21 
Social protection 23 
Other expenditure  42 
 
Development budget expenditures are not calculated on a functional basis. This component of the 
budget was allocated to each of the five categories through departmental allocations from both the 
National Department and Statutory Authority Tables from Volume II, Part 1, Section III of the 
budget documents. Table 7 shows the allocation rules used for the transfer from the development 
budget to IMF classifications. 
 
 Table 7: Allocation of Development Budget Expenditures  
Category  National Department (N) or Statutory Authority (S) 
1. Health 240: Dept of Health (N) 
 241: Hospital Management Services (N) 
 519: National AIDS Secretariat (S) 
 520: Institute of Medical Research (S) 
2. Education 235: Dept of Education (N) 
 236: Commission for Higher Education (N) 
 512: Uni PNG (S) 
 513: Uni Tech (S) 
 514: Uni Goroka (S) 
 515: Uni Vudal (S) 
3. Law and Order 226: Dept of Corrective and Institutional Services (N) 
 228: Dept of Police (N) 
 223: Judiciary Services (N) 
4. Infrastructure 258: Dept of Information and Communication (N) 
 259: Dept of Transport (N) 
 264: Dept of Works and Implementation (N) 
 540: Water and Sewerage Board (S) 
 567: National Road Authority (S)  
5. General All Remaining National Department and Statutory Authority 
Development Budget Expenditures  
 
  
Appendix 2: Categorisation of IMF GFS and OECD DAC Databases 
Category OECD DAC Code IMF GFS Code (Table 7) 
1. Health 120: I.2 Health 
130: I.3 
Population 
Programmes 
 11. Health  
2. Education 110: I.1 Education  13. Education   
3. Infrastructure 140: I.4 Water 
Supply and 
Sanitation 
210: II.1 
Transport and 
Storage 
7. Fuel and 
Energy 
 
8. Mining, 
Manufacturing 
and 
Construction 
 220:II.2 
Communications 
230: II.3 
Energy 
9. Transport 
 
10. Housing 
and 
Community 
amenities 
4. General 160: I.6 Other 
Social 
Infrastructure and 
Services 
150: I.5 
Government 
and Civil 
Society 
2a. Public 
Debt 
Transactions  
 
4. Public 
Order and 
Safety 
 920: X. Support to  
NGOs 
930: XI. 
Refugees in 
Donor 
Countries 
 
2b. General 
Public 
Services (less 
Public Debt 
Transactions) 
5e. Other 
Economic 
Affairs and 
Services 
 310: III.1 
Agriculture - 
Forestry - Fishing, 
Total 
410: IV.1 
General 
Environment 
Protection 
8. Recreation, 
Culture and 
Religion 
6. Agriculture, 
Forestry, 
Fishing and 
Hunting 
 430: IV.3 Other 
Multi-sector 
700: VIII. 
Emergency 
Assistance and 
Reconstruction 
 
3. Defence  
 
10. Social 
Welfare and 
Protection 
 
 240: II.4 Banking 
and Financial 
Services 
250: II.5 
Business and 
Other Services 
11. Other 
Non 
Allocated 
Expenditures 
 
 320: III.2 Industry 
- Mining - 
Construction 
331: III.3 
Trade Policy 
and 
Regulations 
  
 332: III.4 Tourism    
     
 600: VII. Action  
Relating to Debt 
998: XII. 
Unallocated/ 
Unspecified 
  
 910: IX. 
Administrative 
Costs of Donors 
   
5. Budget Support  510: VI.1 General 
Budget Support 
520: VI.2 
Developmental 
Food 
Aid/Food 
Security 
Assistance 
  
 530: VI.3 Other 
Commodity 
Assistance 
   
 
 
